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We have no illusion that changes will come easily or soon. But I believe
that it is a mistake to undervalue the power of words and the ideas
that words embody.
- Jimmy Carter, 1977
[T]he ultimate determinant in the struggle now going on for the world
will not be bombs and rockets, but a test of wills and ideas, a trial
of spiritual resolve; the values we hold, the beliefs we cherish, the
ideals to which we are dedicated.
Ronald Reagan, 1982

I. INTRODUCTION
More than a year later, the explosion of democracy in Eastern Europe
remains astonishing. It seemed the stuff of epic drama but was as real
as the daily headlines: in one country after another citizens rose up in valiant
acts of self-determination and swept aside long-entrenched dictatorships.
Their triumph discredited the cynical pragmatism of realpolitik and
redeemed the quixotic faith that East-bloc dissidents had placed in the
human rights pledges made by their governments in Helsinki fifteen years
earlier-a faith for which the dissident corps had paid in long years of
imprisonment and exile. The downward spiral of communist economies
had fueled opposition to the faltering regimes, and the assurance that Soviet
force would not be used to thwart political change strengthened the
dissidents' resolve. But the human rights revolutions of 1989 were inspired,
above all, by ideals: Human dignity. Freedom. Self-determination.'
In the heady weeks when Eastern Europe's citizens claimed control of
their destiny, the Bush administration was a largely passive observer, as
though conceding its irrelevance to the process. 2 Yet in a complicated way,
the United States had made an important contribution to the democratic
transitions in Eastern Europe and elsewhere. While these peaceful
revolutions drew inspiration from many sources, there can be no doubt that
the human rights policy of the U.S. government played a significant part.
Launched by Jimmy Carter and continued by his successors,3 that policy
inspired dissidents the world over.
1. Burley, Revolution of the Spirit, 3 HARV. HuM. RTs. J. 1, 2 (1990); Symposium,
Transitions to Democracy and the Rule ofLaw, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 965, 993 (1990)
(remarks of Jeri Laber); Darnton, Did East Germany Have a Revolution?, N.Y. Times,
Dec. 3, 1990, at A19, col. 3.
2. See Rosenthal, Striking a Defensive Tone, Bush Sees Virtue in Caution,N. Y.
Times, Feb. 8, 1990, at A12, col. 1 (noting charges that Bush administration had been
"a mere onlooker" as democratization unfolded in Eastern Europe).
3. Although the Carter administration reversed its immediate predecessors'
practice of excluding human rights concerns from foreign policy, Jimmy Carter was
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But if U.S. human rights policy has been effective, its legacy is less a
tribute to successive Administrations' commitment to the policy than to
the power of the idea it embodies. The U.S. commitment to human rights
has been equivocal at best, and flaws in implementation have profoundly
limited the policy's effect. Some of the policy's most important achievements
have been inadvertent, demonstrating that words can be more powerful
than the intent behind them and that ideas can be a potent force for change.
At times, they can transcend the infirmities of policy.
The record of U.S. efforts to promote human rights4 yields rich insights
into the operation of international regulatory regimes. While the U.S.
government's general antipathy toward multilateral initiatives has retarded
the growth of international enforcement regimes, other aspects of U.S. policy
have been more constructive. In this respect as well as others, some of the
policy's most significant effects have been inadvertent. Flaws in U.S. policy
have elicited forceful responses from non-governmental actors, whose
monitoring role has become a key factor in the operation of international
human rights regulatory regimes.

II. U.S. AMBIVALENCE
United States human rights policies have been, in one writer's words,
"a bundle of contradictions." 5 This has been true throughout the past 45
years-the period in which human rights have been a distinct concern of
international law. 6 As World War II drew to a close, the United States laid
not the first President to incorporate human rights in U.S. foreign policy. President
Franklin Roosevelt prefigured the post-war development of international human rights
law when he proclaimed that a chief aim of the Second World War was to establish
every individual's right to the "Four Freedoms." Human rights values also figured
prominently in the foreign policies of Woodrow Wilson and John F. Kennedy.
4. That record has three key dimensions: (1) the extent to which the United
States has secured internationally recognized rights to its own citizens; (2) the U.S.
record in promoting human rights abroad; and (3) the impact of U.S. policy on the
development of an international regulatory regime that enforces human rights
guarantees. The relevance of the last two categories derives from the fact that human
rights guarantees are the subject of international law. In Professor Henkin's
terminology, the "internationalization" of human rights means that violations of
individuals' rights in one country are the concern of other nations. THE INTERNATIONAL
BILL OF RIGHTS 1 (L. Henkin ed. 1981). States are not only entitled to manifest their
concern when other States abuse fundamental rights, but at some level are expected
to react; the whole point of making human rights the subject of international law is
to assure universal enjoyment of those rights by establishing international
accountability for their violatiofns.
5. Buergenthal, The U.S. and InternationalHuman Rights, 9 Hum. RTS. L.J. 141,
141 (1988).
6. For discussion of the evolution of the idea and international law of human

rights, see Weston, Human Rights, 20 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 713 (15th ed. 1985);
L. HENIN, THE RIGHTs OF MAN TODAY 1-30 (1978); T. FARER, THE GRAND STRATEGY OF THE
UNITED STATES IN LATIN AMERICA 63-67 (1988).
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the foundation for international human rights law by insisting that Nazi
leaders should be punished by an international tribunal for crimes against
humanity; not long after the war, the United States made clear that it would
play no part in establishing a permanent international court empowered
to enforce human rights law.7 The U.S. government has played a significant
role in drafting international human rights conventions, but has ratified
fewer than most countries. Even so, it has outstripped virtually every nation
in establishing effective legal safeguards against violations of its own citizens'
rights-a chief aim of the conventions it has failed to ratify. And while the
United States has for the most part declined to submit to the jurisdiction8
of international bodies that enforce or monitor human rights commitments,
it has played a more prominent role than any other nation in legitimizing
human rights as a subject of international diplomacy.
These anomolies reflect tensions that are rooted deeply in American
foreign policy. While human rights have had a special resonance in the
American tradition, 9 other factors have tempered the country's commitment
to human rights as a concern of foreign policy. Two have been especially
important.
First, a reluctance to participate in multilateral regimes has been a
hallmark of U.S. human rights policy throughout the post-War decades.
Although the United States played a leading role in drafting the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights ° in the aftermath of World War II, it insisted
that the document be nonbinding." By the 1950s, U.S. reservations about
7. However valid the charges that the Nuremberg trials were an instance of
"victors' justice," the prosecutions embodied an authentic vision of future law:
international tribunals would be the fora in which international law would be enforced.
That vision resonates in the words of one of the U.S. military tribunals that tried Nazi
war criminals: "Where law exists a court will rise .... It would be an admission of
incapacity, in contradiction of every self-evident reality, that mankind.., should be
unable to maintain a tribunal holding inviolable the law of humanity, and, by doing
so, preserve the human race itself." United States of America vs. Otto Ohlendorf, et
al. (Case No. 9) IV TRIALS OF WAR CRiMiNALs BEFORE THE NUERNBERG MILITARY TRBmUNALs
UNDER CONTROL CoUNciL LAw No. 10, at 411, 499-500 (1946-49). See Orentlicher, Settling
Accounts: The Obligation UnderInternationalLaw to ProsecuteaPriorRegime's Human
Rights Violations, 100 YALE L.J. (forthcoming, 1991).
8. See infra note 17 and text accompanying notes 15-17.
9. Schlesinger, Human Rights and the American Tradition,57 FOREIGN AFF. 503,
505 (1978).
10. G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 71) at 56, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
11. U.S. reluctance to adhere to legally binding human rights conventions during
the post-War period was in large measure tied to the country's domestic civil rights
problems. Conservative senators were loathe to undertake international commitments
that could be used by opponents of racial discrimination to invalidate U.S. laws and
practices. See Genocide Convention, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations
Comm. (Historical Series) (made public 1976), 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1949) at 384
(statement of Senator Wiley). Further, the United States was reluctant to participate
in multilateral regimes that an increasingly hostile Soviet Union could exploit to
embarrass the United States. See Dudziak, Desegregationas a Cold War Imperative,
41 STAN. L. REV. 61, 88-90, 94-95 (1988).
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adherence to human rights treaties had ripened into outright hostility, and
the Eisenhower administration asserted that it would not seek U.S.
adherence to any human rights conventions. 2 Although President Carter
signed three human rights conventions 13 and submitted them-together with
another treaty signed by President Johnson14-- for Senate ratification, he
recommended numerous reservations to ensure that the United States did
not recognize the superiority of the treaties over U.S. law, and declined to
press for ratification of an optional protocol to one of the conventions that
would enable U.S. citizens to file complaints alleging violations of their rights
before a supervisory body. 5 It took the United States four decades to ratify
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 16 and when it finally did it once again took pains
to assure that
17
adherence did not require any surrender of sovereignty.
12. While the Eisenhower administration's position was much in keeping with
the spirit of the times-there was scant support for ratification of treaties that would
abridge U.S. sovereignty-a movement led by Ohio Senator John W. Bricker played
a key role in pushing the Administration to renounce adherence to human rights
conventions. The conservative Senator proposed a constitutional amendment that would
limit the President's treaty-making power by providing that no treaty would have the
force of law in the United States without implementing legislation passed by Congress.
S.J. Res. 1, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. (1954). The chief targets of the so-called "Bricker
Amendment" were human rights conventions. ConstitutionalAmendment Relative to
Treatiesand Executive Agreements, S. Rep. No. 1716, 84th Cong., 2d Sess. at 53 (1956).
To avert adoption of the Bricker Amendment, the Eisenhower administration pledged
that it would not seek to become a party to any human rights conventions.
13. InternationalCovenant on Civil and PoliticalRights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N.
GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967); InternationalCovenant on
Economic, Social and CulturalRights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16)
at 49, U.N. Doc. A16316 (1967); American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Official
Records, OEA/SER.K/XV/11.1, Doc. 65, Rev. 1, Corr. 27 (1969) reprintedin 9 I.L.M. 673
(1970).
14. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination,G.A. Res. 2106A, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) Annex at 47, U.N.
Doc. A/6104 (1965), 660 U.N.T.S. 195.
15. See Message from the President of the United States Transmitting Four
Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, Senate Ex. C, D, E, and F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(Feb. 23, 1978). For discussion of the Carter administration's reservations, see U.S.
RATIFICATION OF THE HuMAN RIGHTS TREATIES: Wrm OR WrmouT RESERVATIONS? (R. Lillich
ed. 1981).
16. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec.
9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
17. The Reagan administration insisted, for example, that U.S. ratification be
contingent on enactment of implementing legislation, thus assuring that adherence
would not make international law directly applicable in U.S. courts. One reservation
and five declarations of understanding included in the Senate resolution of ratification
ensured that the duties undertaken by the United States did not alter U.S. law. 132
CONG. REc. S1377 (daily ed. Feb. 19, 1986) (Resolution that the Senate advise and
consent to the ratification of the International Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide). Another reservation provided that 'the specific
consent of the United States is required in each case" in which the United States might
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Second, the U.S. commitment to human rights has been subordinated
to national security concerns-broadly conceived but most notably focusing
on Soviet containment-to varying degrees throughout the post-War era.
Under the stewardship of John Foster Dulles, the State Department merged
the U.S. human rights agenda with its campaign against the spread of
communism, 18 and the Nixon-Kissinger team abjured the pursuit of human
rights as a goal of U.S. foreign policy altogether.19
Both of these views-disdain for multilateralism and the belief that
human rights values must yield to national security concerns-continue
to limit the U.S. commitment to human rights. But their tempering effect
has diminished significantly as a result of developments in U.S. foreign
policy since the 1970s. Building on the efforts of Congress, Jimmy Carter
established the legitimacy of human rights as a distinct concern of foreign
policy, although the success of these efforts were not apparent until after
Carter left office. 20 And while the United States has remained aloof from
international regimes that have comparatively strong enforcement powers,
there has been movement in this realm as well: the United States has
ratified two human rights conventions in the past four years.21 Perhaps of
greater consequence, recent U.S. policy initiatives have helped strengthen
22
the promotional dimension of international human rights regimes.

III. EVOLUTION OF BILATERAL POLICY
A. Congressand Carter
The first substantial effort to elevate the status of human rights as a
concern of U.S. foreign policy came from Congress. In 1973 and 1974,
Congress undertook a sweeping study of the relationship between human
rights and U.S. foreign policy, holding more than a dozen hearings on the
subject. 23 Building on these hearings, in the mid- to late 1970s Congress
be brought before the International Court of Justice in a dispute over the meaning
of the convention. Id., Reservation 1.
18. See Forsythe, Human Rights in U.S. ForeignPolicy: Retrospect and Prospect,
105 POL. Sci. Q. 435, 437-438 (1990); R. FALK, HUMAN RIGHTS AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY
12-13 (1981).
19. Kissinger testified at his confirmation hearings for the post of Secretary of
State: "[Ilt is dangerous for us to make the domestic policy of countries around the
world a direct objective of American foreign policy .... " Nomination of Henry A.
Kissinger: Hearingsbefore the Committee on ForeignRelations United States Senate,
93d Cong., 1st Sess. 117 (1973).
20. See infratext accompanying notes 41-42.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 88-91.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 97-99.
23. See InternationalProtection of Human Rights, The Work of International
Organizationsand the Role of U.S. Foreign Policy: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
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enacted a series of laws making various forms of U.S. aid and trade benefits
unavailable to countries that engaged in a consistent pattern of gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.2 While addressing
the United States' bilateral relations, the legislation invoked international
law.25 In this way Congress assured that, even though the United States
had ratified few human rights conventions, it would begin to
enforce
26
international human rights standards in its bilateral relations.
Congress' efforts were in large measure a backlash to the power politics
of the Nixon-Kissinger team, an assertion that there were, after all, limits
to what the United States could justify in the name of anti-communism.
The congressional inquiry was prompted in particular by reports of serious
abuses by governments closely allied to the United States, most of which
received foreign aid from the United States and whose violations had been
disregarded as lesser
evils in light of the governments' efforts to combat
27
communist threats.

on InternationalOrganizationsand Movements of the House Comm. on ForeignAffairs,

93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1974);

SUBCOT,5I. ON INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND MOVEAIENTS
OF THE HOUSE COTiT. ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 93D CONG., 2D SESS., HUtiAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD
CoMtUNITY: A CALL FOR U.S. LEADERSHIP (Comm. Print 1974).

24. For summary of those laws, see Orentlicher, BearingWitness: The Art and
Science ofHuman Rights Fact-Finding,3 HARv. Hui. RTS. J. 83, 86-87 & n.15 (1990).
25. For example Section 502B(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, begins: "The United States shall, in accordance with its international
obligations as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations... promote and encourage
increased respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms throughout the world
.... " 22 U.S.C. § 2304 (1988). And, as noted above, various laws made reference to
"internationally recognized human rights." See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
26.

See D.

RECONSIDERED

FORSYTHE,

HUMAN RIGHTS AND

U.S.

FOREIGN POLICY:

CONGRESS

167-68 (1988).

27. In larger perspective, the trauma of Vietnam impelled Congress toward an
unprecedented assertiveness on matters of foreign policy and led it to question the
underlying tenets of foreign policy as practiced by Nixon-Kissinger. Congress was
roused, as well, by a record of reluctance by the executive branch to take any action
in response to abuses perpetrated by strategic allies that received U.S. aid and training.
Since 1968 there had been in effect a "sense of Congress" resolution urging the President
not to approve military sales or credits that "would have the effect of arming military
dictators who are denying social progress to their own people." The Foreign Military
Sales Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-629, 82 Stat. 1320 (1969). (In 1971 the language
was amended to refer to dictators who were "denying the growth of fundamental rights
or social progress." Act of Jan. 12, 1971, Pub. L. No. 91-672, 84 Stat. 2053 (1971)).
In 1973 Congress adopted another resolution urging the President to deny military
aid to foreign governments that practiced internment or imprisonment of their citizens
for political purposes. Foreign Assistance Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-189, § 32, 87
Stat. 715, 733 (1974). In 1974, six months after Section 32 was enacted, the Nixon
administration admitted that it had taken no steps to implement the new law. Fiscal
Year 1975 ForeignAssistance Request: HearingsBefore the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 280-81 (1974). The Ford administration ignored Section
32 between 1974 and 1976, see L. SCHOuLTz, HUMAN RIGHTS AND UNITED STATES POLICY
TOWARD LATIn AMERICA 253 (1981), and made clear its opposition to the policy enunciated
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In the mid-1970s, nongovernmentaJ organizations (NGOs) began to play
2
a key role in focusing congressional attention on U.S. human rights policy.
They presented persuasive, well-documented accounts of human rights
violations in particular countries, and brought victims to Congress to present
first-hand accounts of abuse. It is difficult to exaggerate the impact of these
efforts. Abstract objections to the development of a human rights policy
tended to dissolve, or
at any rate to diminish, in light of the immediacy of
29
these testimonials.
Where previous Administrations had defied congressional efforts to inject
human rights considerations into foreign policy decisions, 30 the Carter
administration embraced human rights as a vital concern of U.S. policy.
Human rights figured prominently in Carter's campaign for the Presidency
and in his administration's earliest foreign policy measures.3 1 Carter's
human rights policy was part of a larger emphasis by his administration
on moral values in U.S. foreign policy; the policy was, in effect,
an "antidote
32
to [the] power politics" practiced by Carter's predecessors.
But if its commitment to human rights was genuine, the Carter
administration had given little thought to how it would make the policy
operational and, in particular, how it would integrate the policy with other
crucial planks of its foreign policy.33 Incredibly, Carter did not anticipate
how deeply governments would resent being lectured about their human
rights records, and his administration often retreated from public criticism

in the law. See Cohen, Conditioning U.S. Security Assistance on Human Rights
Practices,76 AM. J. INT'L L. 246, 250-52 (1982).

28. The impetus for the 1973-74 congressional inquiries had come largely from
individual congressmen. See L. ScHouLTz, supra note 27, at 74. Representatives Donald
Fraser (D-Minn.) and Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) and Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.)
were especially active in promoting greater congressional attention to human rights.
29. See L. SCHOULTZ, supra note 27, at 84, 106-107.
30.

See supra note 27.

31. For example, six days after Carter's inauguration a State Department
spokesman read a statement censuring the governments of Czechoslovakia and Rhodesia
on human rights grounds. See J. MURAVCHIK, THE UNCERTAIN CRUSADE: JMMY CARTER
DiLEMMAs OF HuAN RIGHTS POLICY 23 (1986).
32. Jacoby, Did CarterFailon Human Rights?, WASH. MONTHLY, June 1986, at 52.

AND THE

Although political considerations played a part in Carter's decision to emphasize human
rights, the policy was "pure Jimmy," according to former Carter speechwriter Hendrik
Hertzberg. "... Jimmy Carter had a moral ideology," Hertzberg explained, "and the
human rights policy is very much a reflection of the strong moral impulses tethered
somewhat loosely to a set of political goals." See J. MURAVCHrK, supra note 31, at 1.
Another former speechwriter agreed: "the moral theme was something right in Carter's
soul .... " Id. (quoting James Fallows).
33. Several months into the Carter presidency, one official conceded: "No one knows
what the policy is, yet it pervades everything we do." Drew, Reporter at Large: Human
Rights, THE NEW YORKER, July 18, 1977, at 36.
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its human rights policy would jeopardize vital foreign
when it feared that
34
policy objectives.
The pattern was set in place almost immediately. A scant week after
Carter's inauguration, the State Department, responding to a press inquiry,
issued a mildly-worded statement supporting Soviet dissident Andrei
Sakharov.35 The Soviet government immediately denounced the statementand the Carter administration immediately backed off. The Administration
placed paramount importance on achieving a breakthrough in SALT II
negotiations and, more generally, improving relations with the Soviet
government. Apparently believing that the Sakharov statement would cast
a pall over arms control talks, both Carter and Secretary of State Vance
proclaimed that the statement had not been cleared with them. 6 Yet Carter
could not abandon his Soviet-directed human rights policy; if he backed
down in the face of Soviet pressure, he would risk losing the support he
would need to obtain Senate ratification of any arms control treaty he
negotiated.37 And so Carter vacillated from criticism to appeasement, leaving
the impression that his human rights policy was ill-conceived and poorly
executed.
Believing that it had to choose between pursuit of human rights and
strategic objectives, the Carter administration repeatedly sacrificed the
former when dealing with countries deemed critical for geopolitical reasons;38
Latin America was virtually the only region where the the Administration
believed that it could pursue a vigorous human rights policy without
imperiling vital national interests.3 9 Carter's State Department was
especially vocal in its criticism of the hemisphere's then numerous military
dictatorships, and the Administration slashed military aid to the region
on human rights grounds. But even in Latin America the Administration
hesitated to press human rights concerns when strategic interests loomed
large. In the final months of Carter's Presidency, his administration
suspended aid to El Salvador on human rights grounds and then reinstated
it two weeks later in the face of an imminent offensive by Marxist insurgents.
See J. MURAVCHxK, supra note 31, at 33-34.
35. Daringto Talk About Human Rights, TImE, Feb. 7, 1977, at 38.
36. Id.
34.

37. See J. MUPAVCHIK, supra note 31, at 29.
38. The Administration pulled its punches with respect to human rights violations
in the Philippines, where the largest U.S. military installations outside the United
States are located; South Korea, where, in Secretary Vance's words, U.S. "security
commitments" made it unwise to cut aid despite the Administration's "great concern
... with respect to the human rights situation in that country," Testimony before Senate
Committee on Appropriations, ForeignAssistance and RelatedProgramsAppropriations
for FY1978, quoted in J. MURAVCHIK, supra note 31, at 28; Yugoslavia, Romania and
Poland, whose relative independence from Moscow the Administration sought to
encourage; Vietnam and Cuba, with which Carter hoped to improve relations; and
several Black African nations, where Carter hoped to demonstrate U.S. support for
majority rule. See Jacoby, supra note 32, at 52-53.
39. See generally Jacoby, supra note 32; J. MURAVCHIK, supra note 31.
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Similarly, after taking strong punitive measures against the Nicaraguan
government of Anastasio Somoza, the Carter administration sought to
reverse course when a Sandinista victory seemed assured.
These policy shifts demonstrated how little progress the Administration
had made in conceiving how it would balance human rights objectives against
other foreign policy goals. More devastatingly, the Iranian revolution and
the Sandinista victory-both on Carter's watch-opened the way to charges
that Carter's human rights policy had been harmful to U.S. strategic
interests.40 Further, the Administration's use of punitive sanctions against
a limited group of right-wing governments left it open to charges of political
bias and inconsistency. And so when Ronald Reagan entered office, there
was little reason to doubt that he could entomb Carter's human rights policy
as one of the outgoing President's manifest failures.
B. From Carterto Reagan
1. The Enduranceof Carter'sPolicy: Domestic PoliticalSupport
Yet for all its imperfections, Carter's human rights policy proved more
durable than anyone had thought possible. The Reagan administration's
41
efforts to dismantle Carter's policy encountered fierce political opposition,
and the Administration was forced to back down. A State Department
memorandum drafted in October 1981 asserted, "HumanRights is at the
core of ourforeign policy .... 'Human rights' is not something we tack on
to our foreign policy, but is its very purpose ... ."42 Jimmy Carter had
succeeded after all in reframing the terms of U.S. foreign policy.

40. The most influential expression of this view was Jeane Kirkpatrick's
Dictatorshipsand Double Standards,COMMENTARY, Nov. 1979, at 34. These charges
have been controverted, particularly as they relate to the impact of Carter's human
rights policy on developments in Iran. Although the Carter administration encouraged
the Shah to move toward a more representative political system, see Z. BRzEziNSa, POWER
AND PRINCIPLE: MEMOIRS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY ADvIsoR 1977-1981, at 356-357 (1983),
the Administration was unwilling to apply significant human rights pressure in light
of the strategic importance of Iran. See J. MURAVCHIK, supranote 31, at 210. Moreover
it is scarcely clear that the Carter administration could have done anything to forestall
the Iranian revolution, which was the result of social forces that had built up over a
period of rapid modernization preceding Carter's Presidency.
41. For example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee rejected Reagan's first
nominee for the post of Assistant Secrtary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian
Affairs, Ernest Lefever, who had publicly opposed the view that human rights were
a proper concern of U.S. foreign policy.
42. U.S. Dept. of State Memorandum: Reinvigoration of Human Rights Policy 1
(Oct. 26, 1981) (submitted by Deputy Secretary Clark to Secretary Haig) (emphasis
in original) [hereinafter "Abrams Memorandum"]. Soon after authoring this
memorandum, Elliott Abrams was nominated and confirmed for the post of Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.

Spring 1991]

U.S. HuMAN RIGHTS POLICY

This triumph did not assure that human rights would invariably play
a role in foreign policy determinations, nor did it signify that the Reagan
administration's professed human rights policy was animated by genuine
commitment. Instead, it meant that human rights considerations could
get a serious hearing once the issue was injected into particular policy
debates. This seemingly modest achievement proved to be a vital factor
in U.S. foreign policy-shaping processes over the course of the Reagan
Presidency. Above all, it meant that weaknesses in the Reagan
administration's professed human rights policy could be subjected to public
scrutiny, and this process, in turn, frequently served to correct flaws in the
policy.
During Reagan's first term in particular, the most conspicuous flaw in
his administration's human rights policy was its distorted application. It
was the Carter policy in reverse: the Administration stridently attacked
communist countries on human rights grounds, while turning a blind eye
43
to the depredations of authoritarian dictatorships that were U.S. allies.
Critics charged that the Reagan administration had appropriated the
rhetoric of human rights to serve an ideological crusade"-and to a large
extent they were right, at least during Reagan's first term.
Early on, the Administration fashioned an ideological basis for its skewed
human rights policy. Elliott Abrams, the Administration's first Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, played a
prominent role in this process. Promoting human rights-conceived as an
embodiment of Western values-would serve U.S. geopolitical objectives,
Abrams asserted in late 1981, because it would "give us the best opportunity
to convey what is ultimately at issue in our contest with the Soviet bloc." 45
In mid-1982, President Reagan made clear that the hallmark of his
administration's human rights policy would be promoting democracy, an
approach consciously styled as a rejection of Carter's narrow emphasis on
violations of physical integrity, such as torture and disappearances. 46 The
Reagan administration, Abrams explained, would address not only the
"symptoms" of human rights violations, but also "their causes."47 The chief
cause, in the Administration's view, was communism.

43. Soon after Reagan entered office his administration asked Congress to reinstate
aid to several Latin American countries, including Argentina, Guatemala, Chile and
Uruguay, that had been denied aid on human rights grounds under the Carter
administration.
44. E.g., AMERIcAs WATCH, HELsnI WATCH & LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR INTERNATIONAL

A MIDTERM REVIEW
1 (1982).
45. Abrams Memorandum, supra note 42.
46. Reagan launched his "democracy initiative" in a speech before the British
HUAMAN RIGHTS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S HUMAN RIGHTS POLICY:

Parliament in 1982. See Address to the Members of the British Parliament (June 8,
1982) in PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS: RONALD REAGAN II, at 742 (1982).
47.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HuiAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1983, at

11 (Feb. 1984).
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Human rights organizations were at first skeptical of the
Administration's democracy initiative. It was not that they opposed efforts
to promote democracy; rather, in view of Reagan's earlier outspoken hostility
toward human rights, they feared that the new policy was a cynical effort
to cloak the Administration's indulgence of right-wing violations in a mantle
of legitimacy.4s 49The Administration's early track record seemed to justify
their concerns.
These organizations, together with Congress, played a key role in
pressuring the Administration to pursue a more even-handed human rights
policy. Their efforts were most successful with respect to countries that
received substantial public attention. In social science terminology, "slack"reducing institutions-notably including human rights NGOs, as well as
foreign-policy elites-mobilized to effect change in the Reagan
administration's human rights policy, and their principle strategy was simply
placing human rights on the public agenda. 50 Once the legitimacy of human
rights as a concern of U.S. foreign policy had been established, it proved
embarrassing for the Administration to adopt public positions that seemed
to condone human rights violations. Accordingly, while the Reagan
administration was generally loath to initiatehuman rights policies toward
strategic allies, it found that it was far more difficult to prevail in its
opposition to human rights initiatives that had attracted public attention
or to maintain
a highly visible policy that seemed antithetical to human
51
rights.
Some of the Reagan administration's most notable contributions to
human rights were the result of efforts to stem the public outcry generated
by earlier policies that were seen as inimical to human rights. For example,
Elliott Abrams unwittingly gave the human rights lobby a major boost in
48. See lacoby, The Reagan Turnaroundon Human Rights, 64 FOREIGN AFF. 1066,
1076 (1986). Later, when President Reagan vowed to "oppose tyranny in whatever
form, whether of the right or the left," human rights activists feared that the President
was laying the groundwork for efforts to back armed forces opposing the Sandinista
government in Nicaragua.
49.

See supra text accompanying note 43.

50. The "slack" between the general polity and government regulators allows the
latter to pursue policies without being perfectly observed by the former. See Levine
& Forrence, Regulatory Capture,PublicInterest, and the Public Agenda: Toward a
Synthesis, Working Paper Series C, No. 34, Government-Business Relations, Yale School
of Organization and Management, Nov. 1990, at 20. Slack-reducing institutions can
subject public policy to the effective pressure of public opinion by placing an issue on
the public agenda. Levine and Forrence explain: "Public agenda issues are always
addressed in the presence of a general public deluged with information on those issues
and in a position to ratify or reject as a polity the policies and acts of public officials."
Id. at 43.
51. This dynamic operated in both directions; although human rights NGOs were
initially skeptical of President Reagan's democracy initiative, they were scarcely in
a position to oppose the policy. More to the point, as one after another nation prepared
for free elections, human rights NGOs jumped on the proverbial bandwagon, sending
observer teams to monitor the elections.
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its work on Turkey when he publicly attacked the concerns of NGOs as
misguided.5 2 Until then, human rights conditions in Turkey had received
scant attention in the United States. But Abrams' controversial stancehere was the nation's chief human rights officer serving as an apologist
for Turkey's human rights violations-sparked unprecedented interest in
Turkey. The playwrights Harold Pinter and Arthur Miller traveled to Turkey,
where they publicly criticized U.S. human rights policy.5 Congressional
hearings ensued, and as the public controversy escalated, the Administration
was compelled to adopt a more critical stance on the Turkish government's
human rights violations.
Similarly, President Reagan had little choice but to condemn fraudulent
election practices in the Philippines after initially mispeaking on the subject.
Soon after the 1986 presidential elections in the Philippines, President
Reagan publicly suggested that there had been fraud on both sides-that
is, by supporters of incumbent President Ferdinand Marcos and by
supporters of Presidential candidate CorazonAquino-despite overwhelming
evidence that virtually all of the foul play had been the work of Marcos'
supporters. The ensuing public outcry forced the President to reverse his
position, and he soon declared that the fraud had been one-sided.
More generally, sustained congressional and public pressure forced the
Administration to alter its initial policies toward a range of countries,
including El Salvador, Haiti, Guatemala, Chile,5 and South Africa. 55 In each
case, Congress used the threat or actual use of country-specific human rights
52. See Abrams, The Myopia of Human Rights Advocates, N.Y. Times, Aug. 10,
1984, at A25, col. 1.
53. See Jacoby, supra note 48, at 1081.
54. See LAWYERS COMUITTEE FOR HUmA RIGHTS, HULiAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN
POLICY: LINKING SEcURiTY ASSISTANCE AND HUtAN RIGHTS 36-37 (1989).

55. At the outset of his first term, President Reagan disdained his predecessor's
punitive approach toward South Africa, and urged that a policy of "constructive
engagement" toward the South African government would best serve U.S. strategic
interests as well as the cause of human rights. Substantial public pressure for a more
aggressive human rights policy began to build in 1984, as opposition to apartheid

escalated in South Africa and violent repression ensued. In the United States, pressure

came not only from human rights activists and Congress, but also from a range of other
influential constituencies, including the AFL-CIO, state and local politicians, the
American Bar Association and some sectors of the business community. See Jacoby,
supra note 48, at 1080. The Administration remained committed to its policy of
constructive engagement, but when congressional legislation imposing a range of
sanctions against South Africa seemed sure to pass, the Administration preemptively

enacted an executive order "Prohibiting Trade and Certain Other Transactions Involving
South Africa." Exec. Order No. 12,532, 50 Fed. Reg. 36,861 (Sept. 10, 1985). Two
weeks later, President Reagan issued another order prohibiting imports of South African
krugerrands. Exec. Order No. 12,535, 50 Fed. Reg. 40,325 (Oct. 1, 1985). Although
the orders imposed fewer restrictions than those set forth in the pending legislation,
they imposed the broadest sanctions that had ever been imposed by the U.S. government
against South Africa. See LAWYERS COmnITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: UNITED STATES POLICY TowARD SOUTH AFmCA 4 (1989).
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laws to press the Administration to adopt a more aggressive human rights
policy. Usually, the change was a matter of degree rather than a reversal.
Congress's efforts were limited, moreover: only a fraction of nations that
systematically abuse human rights engaged the attention of Congress, and
its follow-through was uneven at best.5 6 Still, Congress helped keep human
rights issues on the public agenda, and this in turn made it difficult for
the Administration
to persist in positions that were inimical to human
57
rights.
2. Developments Abroad
While domestic political pressures preserved and then strengthened the
human rights policy initiated by Carter, developments abroad reinforced
the policy. Most importantly, events in several countries convinced the
Reagan administration that the United States' own national interests would
be served by promoting human rights-at least in those countries.
Developments in the Philippines played an especially important part in
this process.
If the Carter administration believed that its human rights policy had
to yield to overriding security concerns in the Philippines, the Reagan
administration entered office even more strongly convinced of this. But
by 1984, Administration officials had concluded that widespread human
rights abuses by Philippine security forces were fueling the explosive growth
of communist insurgents. The Reagan administration was persuaded,
therefore, that compelling national security interests required it to promote
greater respect for human rights by Philippine security forces, and it began
to pressure the government of Ferdinand Marcos to curb violations. In
November 1985, responding to U.S. pressure for improvement in his human
rights record, President Marcos announced on U.S. television that he would
hold a "snap" presidential election in February 1986. 58
56. See generallyD. FORSYTHE, supra note 26.
57. An example of this process was the Administration's response to congressional
legislation conditioning military aid to El Salvador on biannual presidential
certifications that the Salvadoran government had satisfied specified human rights
conditions. International Security and Development Cooperation Act of 1981, Pub.
L. No. 97-113, § 728, 95 Stat. 1519 (1981). Determined to provide aid, the
Administration routinely provided disingenuous certifications. While it was technically
able to "get away" with manipulating the law, the resulting public backlash prompted
the Administration to press the Salvadoran military to improve its human rights record.
For example in late 1983, Vice President George Bush visited El Salvador and pressed
the military on several human rights concerns. In the immediate aftermath of his
trip, the Salvadoran military took steps to curb death squad violence. See Jacoby, supra
note 48, at 1074-75.
58. U.S. pressure also played a role in persuading Marcos to leave the Philippines
after losing the election, despite Marcos's claim that he had actually won. Marcos's
decision to relinquish power came after a telephone conversation with Senator Paul
Laxalt, a close associate of President Reagan, who urged Marcos to "cut loose." See
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In Haiti and Chile as well, the Administration played a willing (if
hesitant) part in nudging former dictators to relinquish power. In those
countries, as in the Philippines, the Administration shifted its support away
from leaders it had formerly supported when they began to alienate broad
sectors of their public. The Administration calculated that U.S. strategic
interests in each country would be better served if politically moderate
opposition forces prevailed than if domestic political crises were allowed
to polarize further, strengthening the hand of extremists. 59 Similar
considerations eventually prompted more vigorous human rights efforts
in South Korea and Paraguay.60 In each case, the Administration concluded
that pursuit of human rights, far from jeopardizing strategic interests, would
promote political stability.
The Administration's conversion was hardly complete. Typically, it
changed course only when events overtook its earlier policy. And the
Administration appeared quickly to forget the lessons it had learned in
countries like the Philippines; by 1987, when human rights violations once
again began to emerge on a wide scale in the Philippines, the Administration
resumed its former role as an apologist for the government-now the Aquino
administration-rather than pressing it to curb mounting violations. Still,
the convergence of human rights and strategic interests in several countries
was a significant milestone. For the first time, pursuit of human rights
outside a61Cold War rubric seemed actually to reinforce U.S. strategic
interests.
For quite different reasons, the Administration's human rights efforts
toward the Soviet Union also proved surprisingly congenial with its
geopolitical policy. While Carter had often been in a posture of defensive
retreat from his human rights policy toward the Soviet government, Reagan
took the offensive in pressing human rights concerns with the Soviet Union.
The ascendence of Mikhail Gorbachev, who placed high priority on both
domestic reform and improved relations with the United States, significantly
enhanced the Administration's leverage to promote human rights in the
U.S.S.R., and the Administration relentlessly pressed for improvement in
the course of its summitry with the Soviet Union. The period of Reagan's

Karnow, Reagan and the Philippines:Setting Marcos Adrift, N.Y. Times, March 19,
1989, § 6, at 50, col. 1.
59. See Jacoby, supra note 48, at 1084-86.
60. See Forsythe, supra note 18, at 447.
61. As noted above, even Jimmy Carter frequently judged that pursuit of human
rights would undermine strategic interests, notwithstanding assertions by various
officials of his administration that the two foreign policy objectives were generally
compatible. Because Carter believed that pursuit of human rights had independent
value on moral grounds, he was willing to pay the cost in terms of strained relations
with countries that were the target of human rights criticism when those countries
lacked significant geopolitical importance. See supra text accompanying notes 38-39.
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Presidency saw unprecedented progress in the Soviet human rights record 62
and, simultaneously, the thawing of Cold War tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union.
Significantly, U.S. and Soviet conceptions of human rights seemed to
converge during this period, as witnessed by President Gorbachev's expressed
commitment to civil and political rights.63 While the Soviet government's
recent clampdown underscores the limited scope of these changes,
Gorbachev's endorsement of civil and political rights represented a dramatic
turnabout in Soviet policy, which had consistently emphasized the
paramount importance of economic and social rights throughout the postwar decades.
3. The CarterLegacy
Even with the benefit of hindsight, it is difficult to judge why human
rights and U.S. strategic interests seemed to line up so much better during
the Reagan administration than under Carter. While a complex mix of
factors accounted for the more congenial alignment during Reagan's
Presidency, there can be no doubt that the development was in some measure
due to the long-term effects of Carter's human rights policy, as well as to
Reagan's own human rights efforts. Carter had tapped into a vital force
when he asserted that human rights mattered, and his words eventually
took on a life of their own-even when the words were not backed by strong
conviction.
Carter's first encounter with Soviet dissidents captured the dynamic
in microcosm. Soon after Carter sought to assure the Soviet government
that the State Department's expression of support for Andrei Sakharov had
not been cleared with him,64 Sakharov sent a letter to Carter entreating
the President to "raise your voice" on behalf of Soviet dissidents. 65 Carter
wrote in response: "You may rest assured that the American people and
our government will continue our firm commitment to promote respect for
human rights not only in our own country but also abroad."66 The letter was,

62. It is often asserted that progress during that period was due to Gorbachev,
not Reagan. But this claim overlooks the fact that specific measures taken by the
Soviet leader in the early stages ofglasnost were directly responsive to pressure from
the U.S. government. While it may be true that Gorbachev was, among recent Soviet
leaders, unique in his commitment-however short-lived-to internal political reform,
the Reagan administration helped shape the content of Gorbachev's reform efforts (by,
for example, supplying lists of political prisoners whose release the United States
sought). See, e.g., U.S. Chides Soviets on Rights Talks, N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1988, at
A6, col. 4.
63. See infra notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
64. See supra text accompanying note 36.
65. J. MURAVCHIK, supra note 31, at 26 (quoting N.Y. Times, Jan. 29, 1977, at 2).
66.

J. MURAVCHIK, supra note 31, at 27.
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according to National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, deliberately
"couched in language that made it clear that the President's concern was
global in character and not focused specifically on the Soviet Union."67 Still,
the mildly worded letter evoked a powerful response among Soviet dissidents,
who told an American contact that "one letter... gave enough spiritual
food for them for three months."68
A similar pattern was evident in other countries where the
Administration had deliberately held its human rights policy in check in
light of overriding national security objectives. Long after Carter left office,
for example, human rights activists in the Philippines hailed him as a source
of encouragement for their work, despite the fact that the Carter
administration had asked Congress to approve a $500 million aid package
for the Philippines, to be disbursed over a five-year period in exchange for
continued access to military bases there. Filipinos' impression of Carter
was based less on concrete measures taken by his administration than on
the fact that it had elevated human rights to an6 9unprecedented level of
rhetorical importance in international discourse.
Not surprisingly, the results of Carter's efforts were most evident in
Latin America, where the policy was most vigorously applied. One analyst
described the policy's impact this way:
The results were hard to measure, for in most cases they had less to do with
concrete changes than with a new regard for the idea of human rights. But
the long-term effect of the Carter policy has been significant, encouraging the
people of Latin America to demand their political rights, while reminding the
ruling generals that the world was watching them.... [Some] Latin Americans

attribute the recent spread of democracy in the hemisphere... to seeds planted
during the Carter administration. 0

Human rights movements were, of course, only one of many factors
accounting for the dramatic changes in Latin America and elsewhere. The
retreat from power of the Argentine military may have had more to do with
its humiliating defeat in the Falklands/Malvinas war than with public clamor
for civilian rule, for example. Still, human rights movements had become
an independently significant factor in political change, another weight added
to the scales on the side of democratic transition. And, to some unmeasurable

Z. BRZEZINSKI, supranote 40, at 156.
68. J. MURAVCHIK, supra note 31, at 27 (quoting Ludmilla Thorn). That Soviet
dissidents were heartened by Carter's letter is particularly striking in light of the fact
that, in apparent retaliation for the letter, the Soviet government "stepped up sharply
[its] suppression of human-rights activists." Z. BRzEznIsi, supra note 40, at 156.
69. For an intriguing analysis of how the Carter administration's general emphasis
on human rights emboldened Iranian dissidents during the final years of the Shah's
rule, see J. MURAVCHIK, supra note 31, at 210-12.
70. Jacoby, supra note 32, at 53.
67.
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degree, Carter's policy had strengthened
the resolve of oppressed citizens
71
the world over to claim their rights.
In time, the effect snowballed, as human rights revolutions in one country
inspired citizens elsewhere to assert their own rights. Dissidents in South
Korea are said to have drawn inspiration from the "people power" revolution
in the Philippines, and student demonstrators in Burma were, in turn,
emboldened by the South Korean example. 72 In similar fashion, the
democracy movement in China drew inspiration from the success of
Solidarity in Poland. The "demonstration effect" of human rights movements
is most starkly evident in Eastern Europe, where, in 1989, one after another
ceded power in the face of popular uprisings in a
communist government
73
period of months.
As the human rights policy took root abroad, the U.S. government
became increasingly locked into maintaining the policy, at least in broad
outline. Whenever domestic pressure for human rights improvement loomed
large in a country, that pressure itself became a factor that the U.S.
government could ill-afford to disregard in shaping its broader policy toward
the country in question.
C. The Policy UnderBush
When George Bush took office, human rights concerns were so firmly
established in U.S. foreign policy that there was no question of his
administration changing course in any fundamental sense. Some early
manifestations of support for human rights-notably including the
Administration's efforts to promote human rights in South Africa, its
condemnation of the Burmese government's 1988 crackdown on dissent,
and Vice President Quayle's call for prosecution of military officials
responsible for a September 1988 massacre of peasants in El Salvadorsignaled the policy's perpetuation. United States human rights policy
advanced under the Bush administration in one important area: President
Bush broke with his predecessor's practice of determining whether Eastern
European countries would receive Most Favored Nation (MFN) trading
status on the basis of their independence from Moscow. Under Bush's new
policy of "differentiation," MFN status would be based upon political and

71. Cf. J. MURAVCHIK, supra note 31, at 212-14 (arguing that a crucial determinant
of the state of human rights is the state of the idea of human rights, and that, by giving
high visibility to human rights, Carter had a significant impact on the latter).
72. See Dyer, Why '80s-EndingOptimism Seems JustifiedNow, Chi. Tribune, Dec.
19, 1989, at C17, col. 10; Lugar, Save the People PowerRevolution, Wash. Post, April
18, 1989, at A29.
73. See Pravda, In the Eastern Bloc, Moscow Backs PerestroikaWhile Keeping Its
Fingers Crossed, L.A. Times, Aug. 23, 1988, pt. II, at 7, col. 1.
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economic reform, a policy that offered greater incentive for political
liberalization.7 4
Overall, though, the Bush administration has not evinced a serious
commitment to human rights. It has ignored serious violations in a number
of countries that do not claim substantial public attention, 75 and has acted
as an apologist for abuses by several governments that are under nominal
civilian leadership, such as the Philippine government and, until recently,
the Guatemalan government. It reportedly obstructed the investigation
into the case of six Jesuit priests and two others murdered in El Salvador
in November 1989,76 despite its insistence that the murderers be brought
to justice. 77 And its opposition to strong sanctions against China for its June
1989 crackdown in Tiananmen Square served, in effect, to condone one of
the bloodiest human rights episodes in recent years.78 The Administration's
coddling of China seemed particularly hard to justify in view of China's
diminished strategic importance in the post-Cold War period.
The Bush administration has often appeared to lose sight of the core
insight gleaned from the Reagan administration's experience in
implementing a human rights policy: that U.S. strategic interests are
generally advanced by a strong U.S. commitment to human rights. The
Bush administration continued the Reagan administration's policy of
courting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, who had amassed a well-known
record of atrocity, even though the main justification for U.S. support ended
in 1988 when the Iran/Iraq war came to a close. In fact, the Bush
74. Humi RIGHTS WATCH, THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION'S RECORD ON Humi RIGHTS IN
1989, at 9-10 (Jan. 1990)[hereinafter "Hui RIGHTS WATCH REPORT"].
75. See id. at 7 (citing Administration's failure to respond to serious violations
in Sudan, Mauritania, Malawi and Kenya).
76. A U.S. Army major secretly testified that U.S. military officials had had prior
knowledge of plans to kill the Jesuits; U.S. officials withheld this evidence from
Salvadoran judicial authorities until pressured to release it by Rep. Joe Moakley. See
Wash. Post, Oct. 19, 1990; LAwYERS CoMirrTEE FOR Hum RIGHTS, THE JESUIT CASE A
YEAR LATER: AN INTERIM REPORT at 3-4. When two witnesses came forward to testify
that they had seen soldiers at the site of the crime, U.S. embassy officials and FBI
investigators in Miami interrogated them in the presence of a Salvadoran colonel,
accused them of lying, and reportedly threatened to deport them to El Salvador. See
Sciolino, Witnesses in Jesuit Slayings Charge Harassmentin U.S., N.Y. Times, Dec.
18, 1989, at Al, col. 5. Further, the Administration identified an Army informant
who had provided information about the suspects in the case, exposing the informant
to reprisals. See Gruson, Washington Criticizedfor Identifying Army Informant in
Salvador Killings, N.Y. Times, Jan. 19, 1990, at A3.
77. See Krauss, SalvadoranChief,in U.S., Vows to Solve Jesuit Case, N.Y. Times,
Sept. 25, 1990, at A3, col. 1; Pear, SalvadorPromises Quayle Full Inquiry on Jesuits,
N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1990, at A3, col. 1.
78. The Administration vigorously opposed congressional efforts to impose tough
sanctions, and, in the words of Human Rights Watch, "imposed the minimum sanctions
that an outraged U.S. public would tolerate." HuMN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT, supranote
74, at 2; see also Rosenthal, Chronology Of Betrayal, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1990, at 23,
col. 1 (chronology of U.S. response to Tiananmen Square massacre).
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administration's policy persisted right up until Iraq invaded Kuwait,
precipitating the single greatest threat to U.S. strategic interests during
Bush's presidency.79 Many concluded that the United States' accomodating
treatment of Saddam aided his ascent to power and emboldened him to
pursue armed aggression, and several Bush administration officials conceded
the point.80 Nevertheless, the Administration, putting together a coalition
against Saddam, immediately forged closer bonds with Syria's President,
Hafez al-Assad, a man whom The New York Times describes-along with
Saddam Hussein-as a leader "whose name is virtually synonymous with
ruthless tyranny; whose rule... is based on fear backed up by... torture;
who has not hesitated to kill tens of thousands of his own citizens; who
harbors terrorists .... "8 1 Not a few observers saw in the Administration's
action a haunting replay of its earlier mistake in courting the Middle East's
other notorious tyrant.8 2
In similar fashion, the Administration invited China's Foreign Minister
to visit Washington, ending an eighteen-month chill in diplomatic contact
following China's massacre in Tiananmen Square, in the apparent hope
of securing Chinas support for a U.N. resolution authorizing the use of force
against Iraq.8 3 It seemed a bad bargain even under the Administration's
own logic; the inducement apparently had no effect on China's vote. Most
84
diplomats had thought it unlikely that China would veto the resolution,
and despite the United States' solicitous
behavior, China abstained rather
5
than support the U.S. position.
As under previous Administrations, Congress has played a key role in
monitoring the Administration's human rights policy, challenging action

79. In September 1989 the Administration successfully opposed legislation that
would have punished Iraq by suspending export credits and loan guarantees, and
opposed new sanctions legislation that passed Congress days before the invasion. See
Wines, U.S. Aid HelpedHussein's Climb;Now, Critics Say, the Bill Is Due, N.Y. Times,
Aug. 13, 1990, at Al.
80. See id.
81. Kifner,Assad ofSyria, The Smoother Of Two Evils, N.Y. Times, Nov. 25, 1990,
at E3. Writing of the impact of Bush's alliance with Assad, the New York Times
concluded: "In the murky atmosphere of Middle East politics there were few who did
not believe the Americans had given a nod and a wink in exchange for Syria's
participation in the alliance opposing Saddam Hussein's takeover of Kuwait." Id.
82. Id.
83. U.S. Asks Chinese Official to Visit, Apparently in Trade for Support,N.Y. Times,
Nov. 28, 1990, at A8.
84. WuDunn, Chinese Official Leaves in Doubt How He Will Vote on Iraq at U.N.,
N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1990, at A15.
85. By that time, President Bush had conceded that his administration's policy
of soft-peddling China's human rights violations had failed to induce "what he called
adequate easing of that country's crackdown on a pro-democracy movement." Bush
Withholding Normal Trade Ties From the Soviets, N.Y. Times, May 25, 1990, at Al.
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that appears inimical to human rights8 6 and frequently playing an
independent role in promoting human rights overseas. 7 Though Congress
has continued to ensure both the endurance and the integrity of U.S. human
rights policy, its involvement has remained largely ad hoc.
United States human rights policy under the Bush administration
highlights enduring problems in implementation. While a general
commitment to human rights is now embedded in U.S. foreign policy, both
Congress and the Executive branch continue to face significant challenges
in integrating the government's human rights policy with other foreign policy
objectives. Moreover, neither branch has developed a framework designed
to assure a U.S. response to grave violations. Instead, U.S. attention to
violations remains heavily dependent on the degree of publicity generated
by the media, NGOs, and other slack-reducing institutions.

IV. U.S. POLICY AND

INTERNATIONAL REGIMES

Although the U.S. commitment to human rights experienced a seachange
over the course of the Carter and Reagan administrations, progress occurred
primarily in the realm of bilateral relations. There have been notable
exceptions: The Reagan administration secured ratification of the Genocide
Convention, which had languished since President Truman signed it in
1949.88 And the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 9 submitted to the Senate by the
Reagan administration, 90 was ratified during Bush's term.91 In both cases,
however, the government entered reservations that limited the conventions'
effect on domestic law and restricted the extent to which the United States
would submit to international supervisory or judicial bodies. 92 And neither
86. See, e.g., Krauss, U.S. Cuts Aid to Zaire,Setting Off a Policy Debate,N.Y. Times,
Nov. 4, 1990, at 21, col. 1 (Congress denied Administration's request for military aid
to Zaire on human rights grounds).
87. See, e.g., Kristof, Congressmen, in China,Warn on Human Rights, N.Y. Times,
Nov. 15, 1990, at A6, col. 1.
88. On February 19, 1986, the Senate consented to ratification of the convention,
subject to enactment of implementing legislation. President Reagan signed
implementing legislation on November 4, 1988. See Reagan Signs Bill Ratifying U.N.
Genocide Pact, N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1988, at A3, col. 1. The convention entered into
force for the United States on February 23, 1989.
89. G.A. Res. 46, 39 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, U.N. Doc. A/39/51 (1984).
90. Message to the Senate Transmitting the Convention Against Torture and Other
Inhuman Treatment or Punishment, 24 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 642 (May 20, 1988).
91. See DenouncingTorture Does Some Good, N.Y. Times (editorial), Nov. 19, 1990,
at A18, col. 1.
92. When the Senate ratified the Torture Convention, it recognized the competence
of the Committee Against Torture, the body established to monitor compliance with
the Convention, to receive interstate complaints alleging violations of the Convention
and to initiate investigations of well-founded reports that torture is being systematically
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the Reagan nor Bush administration has pressed for
ratification of the more
93
comprehensive treaties signed by Jimmy Carter.
Its failure to ratify these conventions has left the United States open
to charges of arrogance and hypocrisy for promoting other States' compliance
with international standards while declining to ratify human rights treaties
itself. Still, a narrow focus on the government's ratification record obscures
the constructive part that U.S. policy has played in strengthening
multilateral efforts to promote human rights. Broadening the inquiry to
an analysis of the U.S. contribution to international human rights regimes
better enables us to identify how U.S. policy has strengthened multilateral
efforts to secure human rights-and what, precisely, is at stake when the
United States fails to ratify key conventions.
A. InternationalRegime Theory
Regimes have been defined as "principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given
issue-area,"94 such as human rights. Though perhaps unwieldy for some
purposes, this definition helps clarify how U.S. policy has strengthened
multilateral efforts to promote human rights precisely because it directs
our attention to a broader spectrum of transnational behavior than
participation in treaty regimes. 95
The decision-making processes of regimes include norm-generating
activities and efforts to secure compliance with regime norms. The latter
range from relatively weak promotional efforts to full-fledged enforcementauthoritative decision-making backed by effective enforcement powers. 96
While norm-generating and compliance-directed activities might seem quite
distinct, it may be more appropriate to regard them as occupying different
places along a spectrum of regime activities, ranging from weak to
practiced in the territory of a State party. It did not, however, recognize the Committee's
authority, pursuant to Article 22 of the Convention, to receive individual complaints.
A raft of other reservations made clear that U.S. adherence to the Convention would
not alter domestic law. The reservations attached to U.S. ratification of the Genocide
Convention are addressed in supra note 17.
93. See supra note 13.
94. Krasner, StructuralCausesand Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening
Variables, 36 INT'L ORG. 185, 185 (1982). Cf. Donnelly, Internationalhuman rights: a
regime analysis,40 INT'L ORG. 599, 602 (1986) (defining international regimes as "norms
and decisionmaking procedures accepted by international actors to regulate an issue
area").
95. Cf. Haggard & Simmons, Theories of internationalregimes, 41 INT'L ORG. 491,
495 (1987) (characterizing as "restrictive" and formalistic a definition of international
regimes as "multilateral agreements among States which aim to regulate national
actions within an issue-area"); see also R. FALK, supra note 18, at 9.
96. Donnelly, supra note 94, at 604-05.
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comparatively strong measures of promoting certain behavior. Acceptance
of regime norms is itself a step toward securing behavior that conforms
to the standards. And to the degree that relevant actors' commitments to
norms are strengthened and broadened, the norms themselves take on
greater power to induce conforming
behavior-9 7 -even in the absence of
98
effective enforcement machinery.
B. The U.S. Contributionto InternationalHuman Rights Regimes
It is in this respect that U.S. policy has made its most substantial
contribution to international human rights regimes. By giving greater
prominence to human rights in international discourse generally and by
fostering a greater international commitment to particular norms, recent
U.S. administrations have strengthened the promotional dimension of
human rights regimes.
The Carter administration's emphasis on violations of physical
integrity-torture, disappearances, political killings and arbitrary
detention-helped forge a strong international consensus about those
violations in particular. In similar fashion, the Reagan administration's
emphasis on political rights helped strengthen the international community's
commitment to democratic rights. International human rights NGOs have
reinforced both Presidents' initiatives. 99 These developments have, in turn,
97. As ProfessorReisman notes, "widely supported public order prescriptions [i.e.
norms] either minimize the need for sanctions or generate sufficient support for
conformity demands to supply their own sanction buttress." Reisman, Sanctions and
Enforcement, in INTERNATIONAL LAW ESSAYS: A SUPPLEMENT TO INTERNATIONAL LAW IN
CONTEMPORARY PERSPECTIVE 403 (M. McDougal & W.M. Reisman eds. 1981). At the same

time, the availability of effective sanctions can fortify the norms they enforce; the very
fact that a norm is backed by the threat of sanctions for violations enhances the authority
of the norm itself-thereby minimizing the need for application of the sanctions.
98. Professor Reisman's analysis of sanctions is apposite:
Enforcement presupposes an authoritative decision. Ideally, the decision
is delivered by a centralized institution, recognized by the community as
monopolizing authority in the social sector in question; hence there will be
little question of the authority of the decision. The decision may, however,
emanate from unorganized and extremely diffuse processes and nevertheless
enjoy wide acceptance as authoritative. Consider social sanctions for a gross
breach of neighborhood etiquette. The culprit Jones is not subjected to a
trial, nor is there collusion among the sanctioning neighbors. They all cease
to associate with Jones and his family, however, and invitations to civic and
religious activities are no longer extended.

Id. at 409. In similar fashion, a State that commits grave human rights violations
might be confident that it will not be brought to book before an international court,
but can nonetheless expect to become internationally isolated as a human rights pariah.
99. Prominent NGOs like Amnesty International have long worked to raise
international consciousness about violations of physical integrity. See Shestack,
Sisyphus Endures: The InternationalHuman Rights NGO, 24 N.Y.L. REv. 89, 104 (1978)
(describing Amnesty International's campaign to promote greater international efforts
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enhanced the power of moral suasion to induce compliance with the human
rights standards emphasized by Carter and Reagan, respectively.
The convergence of international actors' commitment to norms, a
hallmark of an international regime, 10 0 also helps cement the willingness
of States to remain in the regime. As "cognitive" regime theorists have
stressed, the values of relevant actors are important determinants of States'
willingness to participate in international regimes. 1 1 Participation is likely
when the values of relevant actors converge and the actors believe that
their
02
shared goals are best secured through international cooperation.
The past decade has in fact seen a growing convergence of opinion among
States about human rights as a subject of international relations. Human
rights considerations now play a part in the foreign aid determinations of
the European Community (EC), 10 the foreign policy of various European
to eradicate torture). And, as noted earlier, U.S.-based NGOs followed the Reagan
administration's lead in emphasizing political rights. See supra note 51.
100. See supra text accompanying note 94, (citing Krasner's definition of regimes
as "principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around which actor
expectations converge in a given issue-area").
101. As the earlier discussion of U.S. policy makes clear, ideology and values played
a key part in prompting the United States to embark on its efforts to promote other
States' compliance with internationally recognized human rights. While support for
human rights was politically popular in the 1970s, both the legislators who launched
the congressional inquiry into human rights and President Carter were personally
committed to the policy they helped craft. See supra notes 28 and 32. According to
Carter's National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, converging values of non-U.S.
actors also played a part in the Carter administration's decision to promote human
rights. Brzezinski writes:
I had long been convinced that the idea of basic human rights had a powerful
appeal in the emerging world of emancipated but usually nondemocratic
nation-states and that the previous Administration's lack of attention to this
issue had undermined international support for the United States.
Z. BRzEziNsKI, supra note 40, at 124. And finally, a strong public commitment to human
rights values prevented President Reagan from abandoning the policy launched by
Congress and President Carter. See supratext accompanying notes 41-42 and 50-57.
102. The core claim of cognitive theorists is that "cooperation cannot be completely
explained without reference to ideology, the values of actors, the beliefs they hold about
the interdependence of issues, and the knowledge available to them about how they
can realize specific goals." Haggard & Simmons, supra note 95, at 509-10.
103. For example, the EC has based decisions to provide aid to the nascent
democracies of Eastern Europe in part on their progress in the realm of human rights.
See, e.g., Commission of the European Communities, EC-EasternEuropeRelations, ICC
BACKGROUND BRIEF,

May 29, 1990, at 9 (in preparation for determination whether

coordinated assistance would be extended to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German
Democratic Republic, and Romania, the Commission sent a fact-finding mission to
those countries to examine their progress "towards establishing the rule of law, respect
for human rights, the introduction of multi-party systems, the holding of free and fair
elections and the development of market-orientated economies"). See also European
Nations Prepareto Impose Sanctions on Moscow, N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1991, at A14,
col. 3 (in response to Soviet government's violent suppression of independence
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governments, 0 4 and the public diplomacy of the Group of Seven major
industrialized nations. 10 5 It is of course impossible to know the degree to
which these developments were a result-if attenuated-of U.S. human
rights policy. 0 6 It can fairly be assumed, however, that U.S. leadership in
placing human rights on the world's agenda helped foster an international
07
environment in which these developments were more likely.
Further, developments emanating from U.S. human rights policy have,
together with other developments in international politics, removed some
obstacles to States' participation in human rights regimes that have
comparatively strong compliance dimensions. Regime theory helps
illuminate this process.
States generally are willing to participate in international regimes, and
thereby restrict their sovereignty, 0 to acquire benefits, measured in terms
of national interest, that are better secured through international
cooperation than through national action. 0 9 States' readiness to take part
in regimes depends as well on the perceived risks associated with
participation."10 While self-interest is likely to induce widespread
participation in international trade regimes, States' perceived self-interest
has been thought generally to militate against participation in human rights
regimes that purport to do more than generate norms or engage in sanctionless promotional activities, since "[a] stronger international human rights
regime simply does not present a safe prospect of obtaining otherwise
movements in the Baltic States in January 1991, EC condemns Soviet action and
considers suspending economic aid programs); Europe'sapartheidcode tells firms to
fight pass laws, Fin. Times, Nov. 1, 1985 (EC adopts code of conduct for European
companies doing business in South Africa).
104. See, e.g., Nepal's Tense Days: ForeignAid Reported at Risk, N.Y. Times, April
19, 1990, at A7 (France, Great Britain, United States, West Germany and Switzerland
threaten to disrupt aid to Nepal if government fails to respond to democratic movement).
105. See The Text of the Political Declaration,N.Y. Times, July 11, 1990, at A4;
The Group of 7 Statement: ConcernFromEast Europe to China, N.Y. Times, July 16,
1989, at 17, col. 1.
106. We do know that, in some instances, the United States has pressured its allies
to promote human rights in their own foreign policy. For example, in the wake of the
Burmese government's 1988 crackdown, U.S. officials urged the Japanese government
to press the Burmese government on its human rights practices.
107. See Schlesinger, supra note 9, at 522 (asserting that Carter's human rights
campaign "significantly altered the international atmosphere. It... placed human
rights on the world's agenda-and on the world's conscience.").
108. To varying degrees, participation in an international regime requires States
to cede a measure of sovereignty to international authority by accepting some normative
or procedural constraints as legitimate. See Donnelly, supra note 94, at 602.
109. See Moravesik, Negotiatingthe Single EuropeanAct: national interestsand
conventionalstatecraft in the European Community, 45 INT'L ORG. 19, 25-27 (1991).

110.

See Donnelly, supra note 94, at 616; cf. Keohane, Demand for International

Regimes, in INERNATIONAL REGMES (S. Krasner ed. 1983) (using market analogy to

explain factors that give rise to international regimes).
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unattainable national benefits.""' If the human rights records of States
that might participate in a regime vary widely, a State's participation could
entail a substantial risk that its performance will be faulted by other
participants. 112 The risk is compounded when potential participants include
nations that have hostile relations with each other; in these circumstances
the regime is subject to abuse for partisan purposes." 3
This analysis is useful in explaining the United States' historical
reluctance to participate in human rights regimes that have comparatively
strong implementation machinery. During the prolonged post-War period
of hostile relations with Soviet-bloc countries, the perceived costs of
submitting to international authority were high, and were not offset by
significant perceived benefits.14 The risks were compounded by widely
divergent views about applicable norms-Western nations emphasized civil
and political rights while East-bloc countries claimed that economic and
social rights were paramount. And until the past decade, pursuit of human
rights was seen by successive U.S. administrations as largely antithetical
to U.S. strategic interests. 115
But the developments examined in Sections II and III altered the
"national interest" calculus determining U.S. willingness to participate in
human rights regimes. Although changes in the United States' conception
111. Donnelly, supra note 94, at 616.
112. Further, governments have been thought generally to lack incentive, measured
in terms of their national interest, to enforce other States' compliance with human
rights norms; the chief beneficiaries of such enforcement efforts would be another State's
citizens, and the enforcement effort itself could inject tensions into the enforcing State's
relations with the offending nation. Donnelly, supranote 94, at 616-17. For all of these
reasons, participation in the relatively cost-free process of norm-generation has been
high-States have participated enthusiastically in drafting international human rights
standards-while States' willingness to establish or participate in effective enforcement
machinery has been lower.
113. Cf. id. at 623 (asserting that the European human rights regime is "'safe'
because it operates within a relatively homogenous and close sociocultural community,"
and that this "greatly reduces the likelihood of radical differences in interpreting regime
norms and dramatically decreases the risk of partisan abuse or manipulation of the
regime"). See also Weston, Lukes & Hnatt, Regional Human Rights Regimes: A
ComparisonandAppraisal,20 VAND. J. TRANSNATL L. 585, 589 (1987). Still, participation
in the European regime is not cost-free. Some States have been the object of interState complaints, and individual petitioners have filed thousands of complaints against
States Parties to the European Convention. States have repeatedly effected changes
in national law in response to adverse decisions by the European Commission and
Court of Human Rights. States' willingness to participate in the human rights regime
of the Council of Europe thus cannot be explained solely in terms of an absence of
significant costs; rather, it appears that European States' commitment to human rights
and the rule of law is strong enough to overcome the costs entailed in adherence to
the European Convention.
114. As previously noted, the claim that Soviet-bloc countries could exploit such
machinery to embarrass the United States has been cited to justify U.S. failure to ratify
human rights treaties. See supra note 11.
115. See supra text accompanying notes 18-19, 34, 38, and 40.
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of its "national interests" were at first largely confined to the realm of
bilateral relations, developments in that sphere had a wider impact on
multilateral human rights regimes-and on the willingness of the United
States to participate in them. Again, insights provided by regime theory
are helpful in illuminating how this process unfolded.
"Interdependence" theorists have highlighted the important role of
domestic politics as a determinant, along with other factors, of how "national
interest" is conceived for purposes of participation in international regimes
(and other forms of political cooperation). The central thesis of
interdependence literature can be simply stated: "'Domestic' political issues
spill over into international politics and 'foreign policy' has domestic roots
and consequences."" 6 The way a State conceives its interests is affected
17
by pressures from domestic constituencies, and changes over time. 1
As we have seen, developments in domestic politics provided the principle
impetus for the U.S. government's efforts to promote human rights abroad.
In the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, public revulsion at the lack of moral
content in U.S. policy set the stage for the congressional human rights
initiatives of the early 1970s and, a few years later, for the Carter
administration's emphasis on human rights. 118 Domestic political processes
also played a crucial part in ensuring the endurance of Carter's human rights
policy once it had been launched. While the Reagan administration at first
sought to define the "national interest" in a manner that excluded pursuit
of human rights as a goal of foreign policy, the attempt was thwarted by
domestic opposition. Diverse sources of pressure-human rights NGOs,
foreign policy elites, the media, and Congress-forced the Administration
to reconceive its policy regarding human rights. 1 9
While domestic politics led the United States to increase its efforts to
promote human rights abroad, developments overseas reinforced the policy
by altering the cost/benefit calculus that determines U.S. participation in
human rights regimes. As human rights movements became an independent
force for political change overseas-generally in a direction that was thought
to be desirable in terms of U.S. geopolitical interests-pursuit of human
rights was more likely to be seen as furthering, rather than detracting from,

116. Haggard & Simmons, supra note 95, at 515-16. See also Moravcsik, supra
note 109, at 55 ("Domestic analysis is a precondition for systemic analysis, not a
supplement to it.").
117. Moravcsik, supra note 109, at 27.
118. See Z. BRZEZINSKI, supra note 40, at 124.
119. See supratext accompanying notes 41-42,50-57. Domestic support also played
a part in Jimmy Carter's decision to emphasize human rights in his foreign policy.
Although the policy expressed Carter's personal convictions, see supra note 32, his
decision to emphasize human rights was reinforced by the issue's broad appeal to the
American public-a fact confirmed by Carter's private pollster-and its potential to
garner unified support by an otherwise bitterly divided Democratic Party. See J.
MURAVCHIK,supra note 31, at 1-7.
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U.S. strategic interests. 120 Further, much as public opinion in the United
States had prevented Ronald Reagan from dismantling Carter's policy,
expectations engendered abroad created incentives for maintaining the
policy. Having raised the prominence of human rights in international
discourse-a process reinforced by the work of such highly visible NGOs
as Amnesty International-the United States would be judged
internationally on the basis of its fidelity to human rights values, and the
judgement reached would have profound effects on U.S.
relations with the
12
citizens of countries recently scourged by repression. '
Gradually, too, the attitudes of governments criticized on human rights
grounds have changed, reducing the "costs" to the United States of
implementing the policy. While no State welcomes scrutiny of its human
rights record, many governments have come to accept such scrutiny as an
inevitable part of their relationship with the United States. Countries that
renounced U.S. aid to protest Carter's human rights policy later instituted
reforms to qualify for U.S. aid, or simply to preserve harmonious relations
with the United States. Further, the convergence of Soviet and U.S.
interpretations of human rights norms,'22 the dramatic improvements in
the human rights records of many Eastern European countries, and the
thawing of East-West relations have reduced the potential "costs" to the
United States of participating in human rights regimes. Significantly, too,
these developments have reduced the costs to other nations-notably
including the U.S.S.R. and the new democracies of Eastern Europe-of
participating in human rights regimes with the United States.
The United States, the Soviet Union, and other countries have in fact
shown greater willingness to participate in comparatively strong human
rights regimes in recent years (although it is by no means clear that this
trend will continue in the near future). 23 As previously noted, the United

120. See supra text accompanying notes 58-61. As the previous analysis suggests,
these developments did not mean that pursuit of human rights by the United States

would invariably promote or even be regarded as compatible with strategic objectives.

Further, the fact that pursuit of human rights objectives is compatible with strategic
policy objectives in some countries does not mean that the U.S. government promotes
human rights in those countries because, or solely because, doing so would promote
strategic objectives. The perception of compatibility may simply mean that strategic
considerations do not operate to block implementation of a human rights policy.
121. The United States' post-Marcos relationship with Filipinos is a case in point.
Despite the Reagan administration's belated support for human rights and democracy
in the Philippines, Filipinos vividly recall-and still deeply resent-the Administration's
prolonged acquiescence in the human rights abuses of Ferdinand Marcos. These
memories have left a strong residue of anti-American sentiment among the Philippine
public, the full effects of which are now apparent. This attitude-entwined, to be sure,
with broader grievances relating to the United States' colonial legacy-has clouded
current negotiations for renewal of the U.S.-Philippines Military Bases Agreement.
122. See supra text accompanying note 63.
123. The following analysis focuses on developments affecting the strength of the
decision-making processes of human rights regimes, and does not consider the actual
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States has ratified two human rights conventions in the past four years.
Moreover, participants in the review process of the Conference on Security
and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) have strengthened the human rights
machinery of that regime. 124 In 1989, CSCE countries agreed to provisions
that dramatically strengthen both the substantive norms and the monitoring
procedures of the CSCE process. The concluding document of the 198689 review session in Vienna sets forth exceptionally detailed human rights
125
obligations which the thirty-five participating nations pledge to respect.
Notably, participating nations agreed to a new monitoring system that moves
beyond promotional activities into the realm of implementation. 126 The
condemn publicly an
Soviet Union was also willing, for the first time, to
27
East-bloc country for its human rights violations.

effects of those developments on States' compliance records. Although there is evidence
that some of the developments considered below have had a significant impact on States'
human rights practices, that subject is beyond the scope of this article.
124. At the conclusion of the 1975 Conference in Helsinki, the 35 participating States
adopted the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Aug.
1, 1975, reprintedin 73 DEP'T ST. BuLL. 323 (1975), the provisions of which include human
rights pledges.
125. Warren Zimmermann, the Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Vienna
Follow-up Meeting, said that the effort to draft a concluding document making the
commitments of the Helsinki Final Act more specific "succeeded beyond all expectation."
The Vienna Concluding Document, Zimmermann proclaimed, "is the most
comprehensive statement of human rights commitments which has ever existed in
the CSCE process or in the East-West framework in general." CSCE Vienna FollowUp Meeting: A Frameworkfor Europe'sFuture, SELECTED Docu msnas No. 35, at 2 (U.S.
Dep't of State Jan. 1989).
126. The Concluding Document established a formal procedure by which CSCE
States could raise specific human rights concerns with other CSCE States, and also
bring concerns about violations of particular member States to the attention of other
participating States both within and outside the rubric of CSCE meetings. Concluding
Document of the Vienna Meeting 1986 of Representatives of the ParticipatingStates
of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, Held on the Basis of the
Provisionsof the FinalAct Relating to the Follow-Up to the Conference, reprinted in
CSCE Vienna Follow-up Meeting: A Framework for Europe's Future, SELECTED
DocUmErrs No. 35, at 37 (U.S. Dep't of State Jan. 1989). In various other respects
both the Soviet Union and the United States governments have, in recent years,
demonstrated unprecedented willingness to submit their human rights records to outside
scrutiny. Although generally loath to submit to such supervision, the Reagan
administration allowed representatives of the Soviet government to inspect U.S. prisons
in exchange for access to Soviet prisons. For its part the Soviet government, long
opposed to international monitoring of human rights as an intrusion on domestic
sovereignty, has not only accepted but also invited international monitoring of its human
rights record. See Gordon, U.S. Team to Inspect Soviet Mental Hospitals,N.Y: Times,
Feb 26, 1989, at 13, col. 1; Taubman, In a First,the Kremlin Allows Foreignersto See
Labor Camp, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1988, at Al, col. 4; Lewis, Soviet Human Rights Shift
Seen at U.N. PanelMeeting, N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1988, at 3, col. 5.
127. See Greenhouse, Soviets, atRights Parley,Assail Rumanian Fence,N.Y. Times,

June 2, 1989, at 17, col. 1.
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These developments stand in dramatic contrast to the situation
characterizing the CSCE review process for much of the first decade after
the Helsinki Accords were signed. For years, East-bloc human rights
activists were jailed simply because they sought to monitor their
governments' compliance with the human rights provisions of the Helsinki
Final Act. CSCE review sessions focusing on human rights were
characterized by vitriolic exchanges between East-bloc and Western
signatories, and no small measure of political posturing and prevarication. 28
But if U.S. human rights policy has strengthened some aspects of human
rights regimes, its contribution has fallen far short of its potential. For
one thing, the Government's failure to develop anything approaching a
consistent response to gross human rights violations 129 has diminished the
policy's power to induce "converging expectations" among international actors
about fundamental rights. Further, no recent Administration has given
prominence to economic rights in its human rights policy.130
Moreover, by failing to ratify key human rights treaties or to submit
to the most effective machinery of the conventions it has ratified, the United
States has helped perpetuate weaknesses in human rights treaty regimes. 13'
The U.S. government's abstention from these regimes 3 2 has more far128. See J. MURAVCHIK, supra note 31, at 84.
129. See supra text following note 87.
130. Although the Carter administration included economic rights among the
concerns of its human rights policy, even it gave little prominence to these rights. The
Reagan administration explicitly rejected the view that economic rights should be
promoted, along with civil and political rights, as a component of its human rights
policy.
131. Those weaknesses have several dimensions. First, international bodies that
monitor States Parties' compliance with human rights treaties typically have rather
weak enforcement powers. Second, human rights regimes with "teeth," such as the
individual complaint procedure established pursuant to the Optional Protocol to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, generally have fewer adherents
than weaker regimes, such as the review procedures established pursuant to the
Covenant itself. Finally, a regime may be weak in the sense that participating States
feel relatively free to flout the determinations of the regime's decision-making bodies.
Cf. Mendez & Vivanco, Disappearancesand the Inter-AmericanCourt: Reflections on
a Litigation Experience, 13 HAMmm L. REv. 507, 528 (1990) (Panamanian government

has repeatedly flouted requests of Inter-American Commission on Human Rights that
the government not suspend habeas corpus during states of emergency, a practice ruled
incompatible with the American Convention on Human Rights in decision of InterAmerican Court of Human Rights).
132. Factors accounting for increased U.S. willingness to participate in human rights
regimes have had comparatively little impact on the government's ratification record.
One reason for this is that domestic pressure for ratification of human rights treaties
has not been as strong as that exerted in the realm of bilateral policy. Although one
can only speculate about the reasons for this, two factors seem particularly pertinent.
First, a key impetus behind U.S. human rights policy had to do with concern about
U.S. complicity in the violations of strategic allies that received U.S. aid and training,
and not with U.S. responsibility toward international human rights regimes in general.
See supra text accompanying note 27. Second, because U.S. domestic law provides
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reaching consequences than abstention by most other nations. Hegemonic
powers like the United States can, precisely because of their dominant power,
help induce less powerful nations to accept the authority of international
regimes. 133 Conversely, when the United States remains aloof from those
regimes or from their strongest enforcement processes, it diminishes the
regimes' authority generally,
and thereby weakens their power to curb
34
violations by other nations.
V. THE ROLE OF U.S. COURTS

The United States' failure to ratify all but a handful of human rights
conventions, as well as its general hostility toward international law, has
also limited both the capacity and will of U.S. courts to enforce international
human rights guarantees.
A. Rights of U.S. Citizens and Aliens
While U.S. law protecting individual rights has registered great advances
in recent decades, it would be a mistake to conclude that guarantees of
human rights under domestic law could not be strengthened or broadened
by U.S. adherence to international treaties. 35 Resort to international
strong human rights guarantees, there has been relatively little domestic pressure
to enlarge those guarantees by U.S. adherence to international treaties. For various
reasons, then, domestic political pressures did not serve to redefine the "national
interest" to encompass support for international treaties to the same degree that they
forced a reconception of bilateral policy priorities. Even so, the trend is in the direction
of greater U.S. willingness to ratify human rights treaties, as witnessed by the
ratification of two in the past four years.
133. See Donnelly, supra note 94, at 637-38.
134. As others have noted, States Parties to the European Human Rights
Convention comply with the judgments of the European Commission and Court of
Human Rights less because of those bodies' enforcement powers than because the regime
itself has strong legitimacy among Western European States. E.g., Donnelly, supra
note 94, at 621-23. United States ratification of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and its Optional Protocol would go a long way toward enhancing
the authority of the Covenant's enforcement body, the Human Rights Committee,
thereby strengthening its power to induce compliance by other States Parties.
135. International human rights law provides greater protection than U.S.
constitutional law in a number of areas. For example, two treaties that the United
States has signed but not ratified forbid use of the death penalty for crimes committed
by persons under the age of 18 or over the age of 70. InternationalCovenant on Civil
and PoliticalRights, art. 6(5); American Convention on Human Rights, art. 4(5).
Although four Justices of the Supreme Court, three of whom remain on the Court,
have indicated that they believe the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution would
be violated by use of the death penalty for persons under the age of 16, Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (Stevens, J., joined by Brennan, J., Marshall,
J., and Blackmun, J.) (plurality opinion), federal courts have upheld the use of the
death penalty against persons under the age of 18. E.g., Prejean v. Blackburn, 743 F.2d
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treaties, either as binding law or for persuasive guidance in interpreting
constitutional protections, could be particularly important in broadening
rights guarantees during a period when the Supreme Court136
appears to be
narrowing the scope of rights subject to judicial protection.
On the positive side of the ledger, U.S. adherence to the United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 137 has enlarged the rights of
persons seeking asylum in the United States from persecution in other
countries. United States compliance with the Protocol and its implementing
law13 has, to be sure, been fraught with problems. 139 Still, precisely because
the United States has assumed legal obligations to assure rights recognized
in the Protocol, asylum-seekers have been able to vindicate rights
breached
14
by U.S. practice through challenges brought in U.S. courts.

1091 (5th Cir. 1988) (upholding death penalty for person who was 17 at time of crime).
International standards also can enlarge the rights of aliens illegally in the United
States who do not enjoy the protection of U.S. constitutional law. Cf. Fernandez v.
Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp. 787 (D. Kan. 1980), affd on othergrounds, Rodriguez-Fernandez
v. Wilkinson, 654 F.2d 1382 (10th Cir. 1981) (although Fifth Amendment protections
do not apply to excludable aliens who have not gained entry to the United States,
indeterminate detention of such aliens is abuse of discretion of Attorney General because
it is inconsistent with international law prohibiting arbitrary detention). Further,
the protection of privacy rights under the comprehensive human rights conventions
is broader than that accorded by the U.S. Constitution. See generally Strossen, Recent
U.S. and InternationalJudicialProtectionof IndividualRights: A ComparativeLegal
ProcessAnalysis and ProposedSynthesis, 41 HASTINGS L. REV. 805 (1990). See also
Warbrick, "Federal"Aspectsof the EuropeanConvention on Human Rights, 10 MiCH.
J. INTL L. 698, 698 (1989) (European Convention on Human Rights has been interpreted
to accord greater protection against corporal punishment in schools than U.S.
Constitution).
136. See Strossen, supra note 135, at 807; Floyd Abrams, Address to Graduating
Class of University of Michigan Law School, Ann Arbor, Michigan, May 13, 1990.
137.
138.

Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577, 606 U.N.T.S. 267.
Refugee Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (1980).

139. For analysis of those problems, see Helton, PoliticalAsylum Under the 1980
Refugee Act: An Unfulfilled Promise, 17 J.L. REFORM 243, 264 (1984) (questionable
practices of interdiction, detention, and unfairness in adjudication process); see generally
LAWYERS COMM1IEE FOR Hui i RIGHTs, THE IMPLEMENTATION OF TnE REFUGEE ACT OF 1980:
A DECADE OF EXPERIENCE (March 1990).
140. E.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,428 (1987) (citing Protocol as basis
of conclusion that Refugee Act of 1980 only requires aliens to establish a "well-founded
fear of persecution," and not a clear probability-the standard applied by the U.S.
government-to qualify for refugee status). See also Bishop, U.S. Adopts New Policy
for HearingsOn PoliticalAsylum for Some Aliens, N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1990, at B18,
col. 1 (in settlement of legal challenge, U.S. government "agreed to stop detaining and
deporting most illegal aliens from El Salvador and Guatemala ....
to adopt new
procedures for their applications for political asylum," and to rehear all cases heard
since 1980 under recently enacted regulations).
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B. Role of U.S. Courts in Enforcing Universal Crimes
In contrast, U.S. courts have evinced unwarranted reluctance to enforce
international law in civil suits brought by victims of human rights violations
committed abroad. Such suits are authorized, under narrow circumstances,
by the Alien Tort Statute,' 4 1 which grants federal district courts "original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." Although
some courts have interpreted this 200-year-old law to authorize suits against
foreign nationals for violations of human rights protected by international
law, others have declined to recognize subject matter jurisdiction under this
statute or any other basis of federal jurisdiction for reasons that
can only
42
be described as an abiding hostility toward international law.
Two of the concurring opinions in the D.C. Circuit Court's decision in
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic14 3 are particularly noteworthy in this
regard. Tel-Oren involved a suit brought by survivors and relatives of victims
of a terrorist attack by members of the Palestine Liberation Organization
in Israel in 1978. The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the district court's decision
to dismiss the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction,'4 but the three
circuit judges set forth different rationales. Invoking the "political question"
doctrine, Judge Robb reasoned that courts are ill-equipped to handle the
issues presented by the Tel-Oren case, including questions of substantive
international law. 45 Judge Bork urged that separation-of-powers
considerations dictated that jurisdiction not be recognized in the absence
46
of international or domestic law explicitly granting a private right of action.
As numerous commentators (as well as Judge Edwards, in his concurring
opinion) have noted, both views effectively render the statute a dead letter,
and Judge Bork's ruling
reflects fundamental misconceptions about modern
147
international law.
141. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982).
142. Decisions accepting jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute include Filartiga
v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531
(N.D. Cal. 1987), amended on rehearing,694 F. Supp. 707 (N.D. Cal. 1988); Von Dardel

v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985). Decisions
rejecting jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute include Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985);
Trajano v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th cir. 1989); Hilao v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th
Cir. 1989); Sison v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989); Ortigas v. Marcos, 878 F.2d
1439 (9th Cir. 1989); Clemente v. Marcos, 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989); Siderman
de Blake v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV82-1772-RMT (C.D. Cal. Mar. 7, 1985)
(WESTLAW, Allfeds library, DCT file).
143. 726 F.2d 774.
144. Id. at 775 (per curiam).
145. Id. at 823-26 (Robb, J., concurring).
146. Id. at 801-08 (Bork, J., concurring).
147. E.g., Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil Wrongs: CombattingTerrorismThrough
TransnationalPublic Law Litigation, 22 TEx. INL L.J. 169, 188, n.66, 202-03 & n.111

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 1: 43

Tel-Oren has generated substantial scholarly commentary, 148 and it is
not my purpose to join the broader debate about the decision's merits. I
wish to makd a narrow point: the hostility of Judges Bork and Robb to
international law was strong enough that both preferred to eviscerate a
law duly enacted by Congress than to enforce the law of nations in accordance
with that statute. 149 In consequence, the Court missed an opportunity to
fashion standards for balancing legitimate bases for dismissing suits against
foreign nationals-and there are many-against appropriate grounds for
accepting jurisdiction. 150 Those grounds relate to the role of national courts
in enforcing international legal norms deemed so important to world order
that all nations are authorized to punish infractions, regardless of where
the violations occurred.
International law establishes universal jurisdiction over a narrow class
of especially atrocious crimes to assure accountability in the event that the
country most responsible is unable or unwilling to bring the wrongdoers
to justice. 151 In this fashion international law seeks to strengthen the
deterrent power of norms that are of paramount importance to the
international legal order, 152 while nonetheless recognizing that primary

(1987) (Judge Bork's view that aliens cannot sue under Alien Tort Statute without
explicit private right of action is based upon two misconceptions of modem international
law: (1) that only States, and not individuals, can enforce international law; and (2)
that private remedies for violations of international law exist only to the extent explicitly
granted by international law). See also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 777-78 (Edwards, J., concurring).
148. See, e.g., Koh, supra note 147; Agora: What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79
Am. J. INT'L L. 92 (1985); Comment, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic: Redefining the
Alien Tort ClaimsAct, 70 MINN. L. REv. 211 (1985); Note, Enforcing InternationalHuman
Rights Law in FederalCourts: The Alien Tort Statute and the Separation of Powers,
74 GEo. L.J. 163 (1985); Note, Limiting the Scope of FederalJurisdictionUnder the
Alien Tort Statute, 24 VA. J. INT'L L. 941 (1984); Recent Development, Separation of
Powers and Adjudication of Human Rights Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
70 WASH. L. REV. 697 (1985).
149. As Professor Burley has demonstrated, the Congress that enacted the Alien
Tort Statute in 1789 had a profoundly different view of international law than that
which now prevails among many U.S. judges. The Founders regarded enforcement
of the law of nations as a "badge of honor," for the young nation could take its place
among the community of civilized nations only if it "was prepared to play by the rules
governing its fellow sovereigns...." Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary
Act of 1789: A Badge of Honor, 83 A. J. INT'L L. 461, 464 (1989).
150. This theme is developed in depth in Koh, supra note 147.
151. See Orentlicher, SettlingAccounts: The Obligation Under InternationalLaw
to Prosecute a PriorRegime's Human Rights Violations, 100 YALE L.J. (forthcoming,
1991). For general discussion of universal jurisdiction, see Randall, Universal
Jurisdiction UnderInternationalLaw, 66 TEx. L. REv. 785 (1988); see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES, § 404 (1987).
152. As Professor Koh points out, the ability to seek redress under the Alien Tort
Statute can help strengthen international human rights law not so much because such
suits offer a prospect of collecting monetary damages, but because a court's declaration
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responsibility for enforcing those norms belongs to the government that
is most responsible for infractions.
Well-established judicial doctrines equip U.S. judges to implement the
scheme envisioned by international law. Doctrines such as forum non
conveniens and the requirement that foreign plaintiffs exhaust domestic
remedies for violations suffered abroad enable judges to dismiss cases that
can and should be tried elsewhere. Moreover, various laws and judicially
developed doctrines assure that U.S. courts are not drawn into matters that
should remain the province of the political branches of governments. 53 At
the same time, the Alien Tort Statute enables U.S. courts to enforce
international law in circumstances where the availability of redress in U.S.
courts would best promote that law.'5 Regrettably, their apparent discomfort
with international law prevented Judges Bork and Robb from recognizing
the important, if narrowly bounded, role of U.S. courts in enforcing that
law-a role that furthers the United States' own human rights policy.
VI. STRENGTHENING THE U.S. COMMITMENT TO

HUMAN

RIGHTS

While the United States has played a leading role in placing human
rights on the world's agenda, enduring problems have limited the policy's
effectiveness. Human rights initiatives are typically fashioned on an ad
hoc basis; whether a nation is the subject of policy measures depends more
on the level of public attention that is drawn toward the country than on
the level of violations in it. Further, neither Congress nor the executive
branch has developed a generally satisfactory means of balancing human
rights objectives against strategic concerns.
These deficiencies in bilateral policy can never be wholly eliminated.
Because U.S. relations with other countries vary widely, it may be impossible
to prescribe a universally applicable response to particular types of
violations; the leverage available to curb abuses varies from one country
to another. Similarly, since security considerations vary from one region
to another and over time, it is not possible to devise a simple formula for
balancing human rights and strategic objectives.
But if the causes of deficiences in U.S. policy cannot be eliminated, more
can be done to minimize their harmful effects. It may be impossible to
of a violation of international law strengthens the deterrent power of the legal norm
itself. See Koh, supra note 147, at 195.
153. For example doctrines such as sovereign immunity and act of state assure
that U.S. courts do not trample on sensitive areas of foreign policy best left to the
political branches. Moreover logistical barriers such as those posed by the need to
obtain personal jurisdiction over potential defendants assure that courts are not flooded
with claims against foreign defendants. For enumeration of obstacles to civil relief
against terrorist acts committed abroad, see Koh, supra note 147, at 181-84.
154. For discussion of other bases in U.S. law for subject matter jurisdiction over
cases involving violations of international law, see Randall, Federal Questions and the
Human Rights Paradigm,73 MINN. L. Rsv. 349 (1988).
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prescribe an automatic, universally applied response to particular types
of violations, but policymakers can and should routinely take account of
human rights in shaping their overall policy toward a country, thus assuring
that gross violations are not ignored simply because they are not the subject
of public pressure. 155 Further, strategic interests that prevent the U.S.
government from imposing human rights sanctions on countries that commit
serious violations should not prevent it from pressing for improvement, if
only through "quiet diplomacy." Finally, both Congress and the
Administration can develop procedures to assure routine review of U.S. policy
toward countries where serious violations have recently occurred. 5 '
At the level of multilateral initiatives, the United States can play a more
effective role by promoting greater coordination of human rights policy
among major lending and donor nations. The European integration process,
which establishes a unique framework for coordinated foreign policy among
West European nations, holds forth substantial opportunities in this regard.
Although foreign policy coordination among EC countries has lagged
significantly behind economic coordination, there have been some efforts
to incorporate
human rights considerations into EC investment and lending
157
policy.
One particularly promising venue for greater coordination in the field
of human rights is the recently established European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, created to help finance economic
5
development in the newly democratizing countries of Eastern Europe. 8
Although created under the auspices of the EC, the bank will receive funds
from the United States and Japan as well as from EC countries. 15 9 The
bank's charter proclaims a commitment to "the fundamental principles of
multi-party democracy, the rule of law, respect for human rights and market
economics." 60 As a contributor to the bank, the United States can and should
155. Specific suggestions to this effect are set forth in three reports prepared by
the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights as part of a project on Human Rights and
U.S. Foreign Policy: BuREAucRAcY AND DIPLOMACY (1989); HuAAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN
PoUcy: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS (1989); and LINKING SECUmT ASSISTANCE AND HUMiAN
RIGHTs (1989).
156. See reports cited supra note 155, for specific suggestions to this effect.
Experience shows that such follow-up is especially important in countries that have
recently begun transitions from prolonged repressive rule to elected civilian government.
The Reagan-initiated policy of promoting democracy has had the unfortunate tendency
of focusing narrowly on the process of electoral transition. Yet countries emerging
from prolonged dictatorship typically face formidable challenges as they seek to revive
the rule of law, and some of the worst human rights violations in recent years have
occurred in newly democratic countries.
157. See supra note 103.
158. See Greenhouse, New Bank to Help EastBloc Revive Its Economy, N.Y. Times,
Jan. 14, 1990, at 14.
159. See id.
160. See Sonenshine, Time for a profitable advance on human rights,Fin. Times,
Aug. 21, 1990, at 15.
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press to assure that human rights considerations figure in the bank's lending
decisions. By applying human rights standards in those determinations,
the bank could provide strong inducement for human rights progress in
Eastern Europe. 161 More generally, greater coordination of U.S. policy with
that of EC countries, Japan and other major donor nations would make it
more difficult for States that practice serious violations to evade the harmful
consequences of their actions, and would thereby go a long way toward
strengthening international efforts to promote respect for fundamental
rights.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the 1970s the convergence of several factors-domestic revulsion at
the lack of moral content in U.S. foreign policy in the wake of Vietnam;
the personal commitment of individual congresspersons and of President
Jimmy Carter; the activities of human rights organizations, foreign policy
elites and the media-served to elevate the status of human rights in U.S.
foreign policy. Since then, diverse actors in the domestic political arena
have ensured the endurance of U.S. human rights policy in the face of
countervailing pressures from a reluctant executive branch and from
competing foreign policy goals, though significant flaws continue to mar
implementation of the policy.
Advances have occurred most conspicuously in the realm of bilateral
policy, leaving the United States open to charges of arrogance and hypocrisy
for promoting other States' compliance with internationally recognized
human rights while declining to ratify major human rights treaties itself.
This common charge fails, on the one hand, to recognize the important
contribution the United States has made to international human rights
regimes, and, on the other hand, to identify the true cost of U.S. abstention
from treaty regimes. Despite its generally poor ratification record, the United
States has helped strengthen multilateral efforts to promote human rights.
Above all, by raising the salience of human rights in international discourse,
the United States has strengthened the world's commitment to fundamental
human rights and has thereby made it more costly for all governments to
commit abuses. At the same time, the United States' failure to ratify key
human rights conventions has helped perpetuate weaknesses in the
enforcement machinery of those treaties, and has served to limit the range
of human rights protections afforded under domestic law. In this respect
and others, enduring limitations in the U.S. commitment to human rights
have diminished the policy's impact, both at home and abroad.
161. As Andrew Moravcsik has observed, the threat of exclusion from a regime
in which a nation wants to participate can induce that nation to agree to conditions
that it might otherwise be unwilling to accept. See Moravcsik, supra note 109, at 26.
This suggests that countries that balk at international pressure for human rights
progress may nonetheless aspire to satisfy their critics if necessary to receive desired
benefits from a regime.

